In the history which I require and design, special care is to be taken that it be of wide range and made to the measure of the universe.
For the worJd is not to be narrowed till it will go into the understanding (which lias been done hitherto), but the understanding to be expanded till it can take in the image of the world, as it is in fact.
Francis Bacon, Parascevc, Aphorism -1 A code is subject to, indeed demands, a single clear decoding or interpretation ....
In hieroglyph the meaning is embodied in the figure itself. This is the struggle between the cipherer and the hieroglyphic poet in Bacon.
He ascribes to myth a double [unction, but the two functions turn out to resemble one another, each depending on "This stands for that," which is cipher and not myth. Deliberately to encode knowledge so as to hide it from the vulgar is the task of the cipher but never of the myth or poetry.
Elizabeth Sewell, The Orphic Voice Pre-critica1 naivete holds undivided rule. This is why modern thought has been unable to avoid--and precisely from the starting point of this naive discoursesearching for the locus of a discourse that would be neither of the order of reduction nor of the order of promise: a discourse whose tension would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being directed at both; a discourse that would make it possible to analyse man as a subject, that is as a locus of knowledge which has been empirically acquired The ted of the Flower has a surface quality (quale) that is there in its specific locale, yet the red is also but a lacquer on a vision that is bottomless. The quale red helps the seer to focus on the flower and to. float above the depths into which it draws him. To see the flower is to "fix" it into a structure, to solder intoa perspective its fluid visibility.
And this is true of the color's relations with other colors and with other perceptual dimensions. The color is a "concretion, not an atom," of something more general than itself and which contains all dimensions. The eye is an "opening" upon a visible world, the hand an "opening" upon a tactile world:
but the accessibility given in this openness must be symmetrical, there must be a kinship between the eye that sees and the flower that is seen. And since the same body can both see and touch, this kinship applies to the various senses too: hand and eye, flower and body-all belong to the same world.
The "perceptual faith" tells us we see the things themselves.
Rut how is this possible if there seems to be this distance between them and us, a distance that contradicts their proximity to us when we see and touch them?
Merleau-Ponty's analysis of vision answers this question by insisting that the experience of "depth," "dimension," "thickness," etc., be accounted for. The answer is to give a name to this same world which hand, eye, body, and flower all belong to. This new name summarizes a new ontology:
"the flesh." With this new ontological "element" we being to comprehend how, for example, distance complements proximity: "the thickness of the flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity .... If is the same reason that I am at the heart of the visible and that I am far from it: Because it has thickness and is therefore naturally destined to be seen by* the body" (p.
131n). The thickness of the flesh is the body's "dimensionality" (p. 135). In one dimension it can see, in another it can be seen, and if lives in both dimensions. This dimensionality or double reference means that it is the body that gives us the things themselves and not flat idealizations, and the body can do this becasue it is, simply, of the same element. Thus the body can do this because it is, simply, of the same element.
Thus the body as a "carnal being, as a being of depths ... a being of latency, and a presentation of a certain absence, is a prototype of Being, of which our body is a very remarkable variant" (p.
136). The visible, sensible thing is a being of Ideas-thoughts, meanings-are strange absences circumscribed in our very flesh and thus able to "possess" us. The cohesion of ideas, for example, "the moments of the sonata," occur within an ideality that has the same kind of cohesion as that of the body with its parts or with the world, because it "streams along the articulations of the aesthesiological body, along the contours of the sensible things" in "a type of surpassing that does not leave its field or origin" (p. 153). For Merleau-Ponty the field of the origin of ideas is the carnal body which they do not leave but which they surpass. Ideas are of the flesh, yet they surpass the flesh.
In this surpassing, says MerleauPonty, lies the miracle of knowlede, of culture, and of language.
It is as though the visibility and sensibility of the sensible world were to "emigrate, His "sign" betrays the familial intimacy of "this" and "that," their common flesh, which, as in a false dialectic positing a third term to rejoin the other two, is usurped by the code. This is as far as we need to go in this stage of the discussion.
The phenomenological perspective to which we were directed by Eco's own suggestions, even if barely sketched, at least clarify our concern about the limitations of the role of the sign in his enterprise. Now we will see if these suspicions can (p. 00). This is an affirmation of the identity of tilings; Paz maintains it is an experience of truth that cannot strictly speaking be communicated in language, as ordinarily understood. The identity of "this" and "that" is experienced by the body, which discourses in images. The images can communicate the ultimate identity of "this" and "that." This is the poetic enigma:
"how the image can say that which language, by its very nature, seems incapable of saying?" (p. 91). 
For
their part, they would simply enunciate the empirical fact that has no place in Eco's discourse. At the heart of artistic creation, and at the heart of the image and of the flesh, glows a perennial mystery:
The word has its roots in a silence previous to speech-a pre-sentiment of language. Silence, after the word, is based on language, it is an encoded silence. The poem is a trajectory between these two silences, between the wish to speak and the silence that fuses the wishing and the speaking.
Sometimes
the poet calls it silence, sometimes, as we have seen, he has other names for it:
On an invisible stem a single Whiteness Merleau-Ponty prefers to call it a "clearing" or an "openness." But it is here, in this utter compression of desire, in this violent implosion that suddenly erupts and scatters into visibility and thunder, transformed into opaline flecks of color in the eye, it is here the sign, the hieroglyph, and not the cipher, a vision in truly free space, it is here the sign is born.
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